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CHAPTER 5 
Trusts and Estates 
THOMAS F. MAFFEI* 
§5.1. Fiduciary accounting: Amortization payments charged to 
principal: Depreciation reserve. Whenever a trust provides for suc-
cessive beneficial interests, the trustee is often faced with the question 
of the proper allocation, as between income and principal, of the var-
ious expenses incurred during the administration of the trust. From 
the trustee's standpoint, the question is of serious concern because of 
the legal duty imposed on him to act impartially toward each ben-
eficiary of the trust. 1 From the beneficiary's standpoint, the question 
is important because every allocation of trust expenses seriously af-
fects the value of the beneficial interest. 
In New England Merchants National Bank v. Kaufman, 2 decided dur-
ing the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court was presented with 
the question of whether amortization of mortgage principal should be 
charged against the income or corpus of the trust. The Court held 
that the payments were chargeable to corpus even though the trust 
res consisted solely of real estate and there was no cash in the princi-
pal account from which to make the payments. 3 
In Kaufman, the testator had been involved in the real estate con-
struction and development business. When the testator executed his 
will, his wife was almost entirely dependent on him for her support. 
By Article Second of his will, the testator devised certain real estate 
"subject, however, to any mortgage or mortgages . . . which may exist 
thereon at the time of my death . . . " to his trustees and directed 
them to pay to his wife for her life "the net income" up to a stated 
annual maximum and further directed them to distribute the excess 
annual income, if any, in equal shares to his daughter and grandson. 4 
*THOMAS F. MAFFEI is an associate in the law firm of Choate, Hall & Stewart, Boston. 
§5.1. 1 Kingsley v. Spofford, 298 Mass. 469, 4 77, II N .E.2d 487, 492 (193 7); Re-
statement (Second) of Trusts§ 232, at 555 (I959); 3 A. Scott, Trusts§ 232, at I894 (3d 
ed. I967). 
2 I973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 623,295 N.E.2d 388. 
3 Id. at 626-29, 295 N.E.2d at 39I-92. 
4 Id. at 624, 295 N.E.2d at 389. 
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On the wife's death, the trustees were directed to distribute the prin-
cipal of the trust to a named charity. 5 
The trust corpus consisted solely of interests in two parcels of real 
estate, both of which had been encumbered with mortgages since the 
testator's death in 1965.6 From the inception of the trust, there had 
never been any cash in the principal account and the trustees had 
been charging all expenses, including payments on- the mortgages, 
against current rent receipts. Because the income beneficiaries ques-
tioned the trustees' method of accounting for the mortgage payments, 
the trustees filed a petition for instructions on the proper method of 
computing the "net income" of the trust. 7 
Following a hearing, the probate judge decreed that the income 
beneficiaries were the primary objects of the testator's donative intent 
and ordered the trustees not to charge the income of the trust with 
the principal payments on the mortgages. The judge also ordered that 
if the cash flow of the trust was insufficient to permit a current dis-
tribution of the entire net income, the undistributed net income was 
to be distributed as soon as funds became available and was to be 
charged against the principal of the trust together with four per cent 
interest from the date on which the distribution should have been 
made. 8 Finally, the decree authorized the trustees to borrow money 
5 Article Second in its entirety read: 
All right, title, and interest which I may own at the time of my death in any real 
estate wherever located, except the real estate at 161 Cabot Street, Brookline, Mas-
sachusetts, subject, however, to any mortgage or mortgages, or other encum-
brances, or any lien or liens, which may exist thereon at the time of my death, in 
fee simple absolute to the TRUSTEE under this my Will, IN TRUST 
NEVERTHELESS, for the following trust purposes and to be known as 'Trust B'; 
and also to the co-trustee; 
(a) To pay to or apply for the benefit of my wife, JEANNE 0. KOUFMAN, as 
long as she shall live, the net income in monthly installments up to ten thousand 
dollars ($10,000.00) for each twelve month period. 
(b) To pay the net income in excess of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) if any, 
for the rest of such period of twelve months by equal monthly installments in 
equal shares during the period of the following twelve months to BEVERLY 
TUTTLE and my grandson, JAMES A. KOUFMAN, or to apply the same for 
their benefit in the same manner, or to be the survivor of them. 
(c) Upon the death of my said wife, Jeanne 0. Koufman, to pay and transfer the 
principal of this trust to the CHILDREN'S CANCER RESEARCH FOUNDA-
TION commonly known as "Jimmy Fund" and located in Boston, Massachusetts, 
for its unrestricted use consistent with its charitable purposes. 
Id at 624, 295 N.E.2d at 389. 
6 At the testator's death, the real estate was valued at $795,000 and the outstanding 
balance on the mortgages was $547,164.01, leaving an equity in the property at that 
time of $247,844.98. By July 1971, the mortgage balance had been reduced to 
$463,494.88. Id. at 624-25, 295 N.E.2d at 389-90. 
7 Id. at 625, 295 N.E.2d at 390. 
8 Id. at 626, 295 N.E.2d at 390. The decree provided, however, that if the accrued 
interest charges would reduce the corpus below the value of the equity at the time of 
the testator's death, then the charges should be abated so as to preserve the original 
value. I d. at 626 n.1, 295 N .E.2d at 390 n.1. 
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on the trust corpus in order to effectuate the testator's intent to pro-
vide for the income beneficiaries. 9 
In affirming the decree of the probate court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court firmly settled the question of who, as between the income ben-
eficiaries and the remainderman, should bear the economic burden 
created by a mortgage on trust property. In addition, the facts of the 
case presented the Court with a situation not usually present in cases 
dealing with the allocation of trust administration expenses, namely, 
the practical problem of providing a method for payment where no 
principal cash is available. In fact, the very existence of the latter 
problem was relied upon by the remainderman in arguing that the 
testator must have intended the amortization payments to be charged 
against income. Otherwise, the remainderman argued, this trust, 
created by a "shrewd real estate investor," would have been 
unworkable. 10 
Notwithstanding the remainderman's argument that the lack of any 
cash in the principal account furnished a basis for discerning the 
testator's intent, the Court relied on the widely accepted rule that, ab-
sent any indication in the instrument to the contrary, amortization 
payments on mortgages on trust property are always to be treated as a 
charge against the corpus of the trustY In the circumstances pre-
sented to the Court in Kaufman, a construction of the words "net in-
come" to mean income available after charging principal expenses 
thereto would have had the effect of shifting the beneficial interests 
of the trust in a manner not intended by the testator. On this basis 
alone, the Court held that the payments should be charged against 
corpus. "[T]he value of this rule [charging mortgage amortization to 
corpus] is not simply precedential; its compelling justification is that 
charging principal amortization to income essentially shifts the benefi-
cial interest to the remainderman from income beneficiaries, presum-
ably in alteration of the balance envisioned by the decedent."12 
The Kaufman decision is sound from a legal as well as a practical 
standpoint. Clearly, principal amortization payments are not in the 
nature of ordinary current expenses such as interest on mortgages 
and other indebtedness, regularly recurring taxes, insurance pre-
miums and ordinary repairs, all of which traditionally have been 
charged against income. 13 Rather, they are in the nature of perma-
9 Id. at 626, 295 N.E.2d at 390. 
10 Id. at 627, 295 N.E.2d at 391. 
11 Ellis v. King, 336 III. App. 298, 83 N.E.2d 367 (1949); In re Marshall's Will, 21 
Misc.2d 154, 191 N.Y.S.2d 299 (Sur. Ct. 1959); Holmes v. Hrobon, 93 Ohio App. 1, 
103 N.E.2d 845 (1951); G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees§§ 603, 808, at 172, 397 (2d ed. 
1960); 3 A. Scott, Trusts§ 233, at 1897 (3d ed. 1967); Revised Uniform Principal and 
Income Act § 13(c)(2). 
12 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 628, 295 N.E.2d at 391-92. 
13 Kingsley v. Spofford, 298 Mass. 469, 11 N.E.2d 487 (1937) (fire insurance); Park-
hurst v. Ginn, 228 Mass. 159, 117 N.E. 202 (1917) (taxes); Bridge v. Bridge, 146 Mass. 
373, 15 N.E. 899 (1888) (interest on mortgage, repairs, taxes, water rates, insurance); 
Root v. Yeomans, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 488 (1834) (ordinary repairs). 
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nent improvements to the trust property which are of maximum ben-
efit to the remainderman and, as such, have always been considered a 
charge against trust corpus. 14 To have required in Koufman that the 
principal payments be charged against income would have had the ef-
fect of enriching the remainderman at the expense of the income 
beneficiaries who, according to the probate judge's findings, were the 
primary objects of the testator's donative intent. 
From a practical point of view, the lack of any cash in the principal 
account presents no serious obstacle to charging the amortization 
payments against corpus. One possibility, of course, is for the remain-
derman to satisfy the mortgages. 15 Another alternative, authorized by 
the decree, is for the trustees to borrow money on the trust res in 
order to make the payments. In view of the language in Article 
Eighth of the will authorizing the trustees to mortgage, sell, exchange 
or otherwise dispose of the trust property, 16 the authorization to bor-
row is consistent with the testator's intent. Finally, the provision for 
interest incorporated into the decree insures the income beneficiaries 
against any diminution in the value of their income interest on ac-
count of a delay in payment while preserving the value of the re-
mainder as it existed at the time of the testator's death. 
Anticipating that the Court would follow the general rule regarding 
principal amortization payments, the remainderman argued in the al-
ternative that a reserve for depreciation of the real estate should be 
established and charged against the income of the trust. 17 Aside from 
the fact, however, that the weight of authority is against establishing 
such a reserve where the trust corpus consists of commercial or rental 
property, 18 the facts presented in Koufman did not suggest that such a 
reserve was warranted. 
Generally, a reserve is set aside to assure the remainderman that 
the value of the corpus of the trust will not be diminished by depre-
ciation or obsolescence. In the usual case, a reserve is established 
where the trust property consists of assets which gradually decline in 
value either because they are of inherently limited life or because 
their use causes them to diminish in value. Clear examples of such as-
sets, sometimes referred to as "wasting assets," include leaseholds, 
14 Little v. Little, 161 Mass. 188, 36 N.E. 795 (1894); Plympton v. Boston. Dispensary, 
106 Mass. 544 (1871); G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees§ 805, at 150 (2d ed. 1960). 3 A. 
Scott, Trusts § 233.3, at 1909 (3d ed. 1967). 
15 This approach was suggested by the probate judge when he stated that "the gift to 
the remainderman of the equity in the real estate at the time of the decedent's death, to 
the extent that the remainderman does not elect to satisfy any mortgage or mortgages, is subject to 
the prior rights of the income beneficiaries to the net income." 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
625, 295 N.E.2d at 390 (emphasis added). 
16 Id. at 628, 295 N.E.2d at 391. 
17 Id. at 629-31, 295 N.E.2d at 392-93. 
18 Matter of Siegel, 29 App. Div. 2d 5()2, 288 N.Y.S.2d 944 (App. Div. 1968); Matter 
of Crimmins, 159 Misc. 499, 288 N.Y.S. 552 (Sur. Ct. 1936); Welch v. Welch, 235 Wis. 
282, 290 N.W. 758 (1940); G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 829, at 458 (2d ed. 1960); 
3 A. Scott, Trusts § 239.4, at 2048 (3d ed. 1967). 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1974 [1974], Art. 8
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1974/iss1/8
§5.2 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 87 
royalties from books or inventions, and interests m mmes, wells, 
forests, and quarries. 19 
In Koufman, the trust consisted solely of interests in two parcels of 
commercial real estate. Not only was there no evidence of physical 
depreciation, but the parties agreed that the properties had actually 
appreciated in value since the testator's death. In these circumstances, 
the Court was clearly correct in refusing to order the trustees to estab-
lish a reserve. In the absence of any direction in the will regarding a 
reserve for depreciation, it is unlikely that the testator would have fa-
vored deductions against the income of the trust in order to protect 
the remainderman against a possible diminution in value of the real 
estate. In fact, given the probate judge's finding that the income ben-
eficiaries were the primary objects of the testator's donative intent, it 
is more probable that the testator intended depreciation and obsoles-
cence to be risks borne by the remainderman in exchange for the very 
real possibility that the property would, as it did, appreciate in value. 
§5.2. Fiduciaries: Reopening prior accounts: Fraud: Self-dealing: 
Negligence. The purpose of the fiduciary's duty to account periodi-
cally for the property entrusted to him is two-fold. 1 On the one 
hand, by providing a means of complete and accurate disclosure, it is 
intended to insure that the beneficiaries of an estate, trust, or other 
fiduciary relationship receive the benefits to which they are entitled. 2 
On the other hand, it provides a method by which the fiduciary is dis-
charged from responsibility for his handling of the property during 
the period covered by the account. 3 The latter purpose is actually a 
part of the more general statutory policy of expediting the adminis-
tration of estates and trusts by imposing a degree of finality on the al-
lowance of all fiduciary accounts. During the Survey year, the Su-
preme Judicial Court in O'Brien v. Dwight4 reviewed at length the ob-
ligations imposed on a fiduciary in rendering his account and the 
standard of conduct governing his activity as a fiduciary. 
Chapter 206, section 24 of the General Laws specifically provides 
that "[a]fter final decree has been entered on any ... account it shall 
19 G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 829, at 458 (2d ed. 1960); 3 A. Scott, Trusts § 
239.4, at 2048 (3d ed. 1967); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 239 at 591 (1959), 
comment h. 
§5.2. 1 G.L. c. 206, § 1, provides in part: 
An executor, administrator, guardian or conservator, or a trustee required by 
law to give bond to a judge of probate, shall render an account relative to the es-
tate in his hands at least once a year and at such other times as shall be required 
by the court .... 
2 G.L. c. 206, § 2; Restatement (Second) of Trusts§§ 172, 173, at 376 (1959). 
3 See Holyoke Nat'! Bank v. Wilson, 350 Mass. 223, 214 N.E.2d 42 (1966); Restate-
ment (Second) of Trusts § 220, at 514 (1959); 2 G. Newhall, Settlement of Estates and 
Fiduciary Law in Massachusetts§ 287, at 241 (4th ed. 1958); 3 A. Scott, Trusts§ 220, at 
1765 (3d ed. 1967). 
4 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 409, 294 N.E.2d 363. 
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not be impeached except for fraud or manifest error."5 This section 
was amended in 1938 to make clear that interim as well as final 
fiduciary accounts are to be afforded the same degree of finality as 
decrees entered in other proceedings before the probate court. 6 Sec-
tion 24 is obviously founded on the long-established public policy that 
once a matter has been properly heard and determined by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, it should not be reopened. In line with that 
policy, the Supreme Judicial Court on a number of occasions has held 
that a matter would not be relitigated where a claim is made that cer-
tain testimony was false or that material evidence was either sup-
pressed or concealed. 7 
Despite the desirability of achieving finality in all court proceedings, 
there are numerous cases in which the Court has acted to reopen a 
prior probate court decree where the interests of justice required such 
action. For the most part, these cases have relied on the "fraud or 
manifest error" language contained in section 24. It has been held, 
for example, that a decree will be reopened where an affected person 
was not given notice of a proceeding or afforded an opportunity to 
litigate an issue claimed to have been adjudicated by the decree. 8 In 
some cases, the failure to notify or otherwise afford an interested 
party an opportunity to be heard has been the result of an accident or 
mistake. 9 In others, where the failure was intentional, the Court has 
had no difficulty finding fraud within the meaning of section 24. 10 
An infrequent but nonetheless clear example of the fraud necessary 
to set aside an earlier account is the situation where the fiduciary has 
engaged in self-dealing and has disguised it by filing an inaccurate or 
incomplete account. In this situation, the Court has been quick to 
grant relief. In a leading case, Jose v. Lyman,1 1 one of several co-
executors had purchased from the estate, at private sale, some se-
curities of a closely-held corporation which the testator had pledged 
5 G.L. c. 206, § 24. 
6 Acts of 1938, c. 154, § l. 
7 Stephens v. Lampron, 308 Mass. 50, 53, 30 N.E.2d 838, 839 (1941) (decree of pro-
bate procured through fraud of principal beneficiary who secreted potential witness 
against the will not revoked); Renwick v. Macomber, 233 Mass. 530, 533-34, 124 N.E. 
670, 671 (1919) (decree of probate procured by fraud of sole legatee through suppres-
sion of facts showing testamentary incapacity held not open to revocation after time for 
appeal had passed); Zeitlin v. Zeitlin, 202 Mass. 205, 207, 88 N.E. 762 (1909) (a libel to 
set aside a decree of divorce on the ground that it was obtained by false testimony, 
fraudulently procured, cannot be maintained). 
8 E.g., Jose v. Lyman, 316 Mass. 271,55 N.E.2d 433 (1944); O'Sullivan v. Palmer, 312 
Mass. 240, 44 N.E.2d 958 (1942); Lovell v. Lovell, 276 Mass. 10, 176 N.E. 210 (1931); 
Sullivan v. Sullivan, 266 Mass. 228, 165 N.E. 89 (1929); Child v. Clark, 231 Mass. 3, 120 
N.E. 77 (1918). 
9 E.g., Lovell v. Lovell, 276 Mass. 10, 176 N.E. 210 (1931); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 266 
Mass. 228, 165 N.E. 89 (1929). 
10 E.g., O'Sullivan v. Palmer, 312 Mass. 240, 44 N.E.2d 958 (1942); Child v. Clark, 
231 Mass. 3, 120 N.E. 77 (1918). 
11 316 Mass. 271, 55 N.E.2d 433 (1944). 
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to the co-executor as security for a loan. To protect the value of the 
securities, the co-executor had entered into an agreement with 
another large holder of securities in the same company that neither 
one would sell them for eighteen months. The legatees under the will 
and the beneficiaries of a testamentary trust were not informed of the 
details of the stock transaction. The executors' account, assented to by 
all persons, merely indicated that the shares had been sold and that 
the proceeds had been paid to one of the executors in satisfaction of 
the testator's obligation to him. The account did not, however, indi-
cate that the executor was the purchaser of the shares. Four years 
after a decree allowing the executors' account was entered, one of the 
heirs filed a petition to revoke the decree alleging that fraud and 
manifest error within the meaning of section 24 had been 
committed. 12 In reversing the probate court's dismissal of the petition, 
the Supreme Judicial Court held that the allowance of the account 
had been procured by fraud in law, stating: 
[The executor] could not derive any personal advantage at the 
expense of the trust, and could not put himself in a position an-
tagonistic to the interests of those whom he represented, even if 
the price was adequate . . . . If a trustee deals fairly, openly and 
in good faith, a transaction in which he is personally interested 
will not be avoided. . . . But no advantage could be taken of the 
parties beneficially interested, by misrepresentation or conceal-
ment of any important fact, and they must be in a position to un-
derstand the nature and effect of the [transaction]." 
. . . By virtue of the failure of the executors to disclose the facts 
and the misleading wording of the items in the account concern-
ing the transaction in question, it is proper to conclude that the 
petitioners were in effect denied an opportunity to face the real 
situation and to dispute the action of [the co-executor] ... _13 
In O'Brien v. Dwight, 14 the Supreme Judicial Court was asked to re-
consider its holding in the Jose case. Justice Quirico, speaking for an 
unanimous Court, reaffirmed the principles set forth in the Jose case, 
stating: 
The holding of [the Jose] case is an important step in maintaining 
a reasonable balance between the obligations undertaken by the 
fiduciary when he accepts the position and the right of the bene-
ficiaries of an estate, trust or other fiduciary relationship to re-
ceive the benefits due them from the proper discharge of 
fiduciary's duties. The rules applied and the results reached in the 
Jose case ... impose no new or additional risk, burden or liability 
on any fiduciary whose conduct complies with the long established 
12 Id. at 272, 55 N.E.2d at 434. 
13 Id. at 278, 281-82, 55 N.E.2d at 437, 439. 
14 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 409, 294 N.E.2d 363. 
7
Maffei: Chapter 5: Trusts and Estates
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1974
90 1974 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §5.2 
basic principles governing the conduct of fiduciaries in their deal-
ings with trust property. 15 
In O'Brien, the testator owned substantially all of the stock in 
Holyoke Transcript, Inc., a family corporation engaged in the news-
paper publishing business. His will, allowed on April 23, 1930, gave 
all of his property to his wife for her life and provided that upon her 
death, the corporation's stock was to be distributed to his son William, 
his two daughters, and to a trustee for the benefit of his son Henry. 16 
Mrs. Dwight died on July 31, 1957. Prior to her death, she had been 
the executrix of her husband's estate as well as a principal officer with 
her brother and son William of Holyoke Transcript, Inc. 
Shortly after the testator's death, Mrs. Dwight, along with her 
brother and William, formed another Massachusetts corporation 
under the name of Holyoke-Transcript-Telegram Publishing Co., Inc. 
Mrs. Dwight became the owner of substantially all of the stock in the 
new corporation, whose corporate purposes were almost identical to 
those of the earlier family corporation. In 1934, while Mrs. Dwight, 
her brother, and William were in control of both corporations, 
Holyoke Transcript, Inc. 17 leased its entire physical plant to the new 
corporation and gave the latter a license to publish a newspaper 
under the same name as that published by the earlier corporation. In 
effect, the entire newspaper publishing business of Holyoke Trans-
cript, Inc. was transferred to the new corporation. 18 
Mrs. Dwight died in 1957. By means of gifts made prior to her 
death and by her will, Mrs. Dwight transferred ownership of the new 
corporation to William and her two daughters. The testator's son 
Henry, who was to receive a one-sixth interest in Holyoke Transcript, 
Inc. under his father's will, received no interest in the new corpora-
tion under his step-mother's will or otherwise despite the fact that the 
new corporation had, in effect, succeeded to the entire business of 
Holyoke Transcript, Inc. Instead, the trustee of the trust for the ben-
efit of Henry received a distribution of one-sixth of the shares of 
Holyoke Transcript, Inc., a corporation which by that time had been 
15 Id. at 438, 294 N.E.2d at 382-83. 
16 The· testator died leaving a widow who was his second wife, a son Henry by his 
first wife, and a son William and two daughters by his second wife. I d. at 411, 294 
N.E.2d at 367. 
17 Id. at 412-13, 294 N.E.2d at 368-69. 
18 At the time that the vote was taken to transfer the newspaper publishing business 
to the new corporation, the board of directors of Holyoke Transcript, Inc. consisted 
solely of Mrs. Dwight and her son William. The vote provided in part: 
the assistant treasurer and the clerk ... are, authorized ... to lease the real estate, 
presses and other property of the Holyoke Transcript, Inc., . . . in whole or in 
part, to a new corporation ... for such consideration ... and on such terms as 
they deem best ... and voted further that said new corporation be accorded the 
privilege of using ... the name of the newspaper now published in Holyoke, Mas-
sachusetts, by Holyoke Transcript, Inc. ... 
Id. at 414 n.6, 294 N.E.2d at 369 n.6. 
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transformed into what was essentially a real estate holding and prop-
erty leasing company. Subsequently, the trustee sold the shares in 
Holyoke Transcript, Inc. to William at their then appraised value and 
invested the proceeds in diversified securities and bank deposits. 19 
During the period from the allowance of the testator's will on April 
23, 1930 until the filing by the trustee of the trust for the benefit of 
Henry of its first account on October 1, 1958, only three probate ac-
counts were filed. Mrs. Dwight, as executrix, filed her fir:st account on 
December 31, 1956, covering a period of almost twenty-seven years. 20 
That account included substantially all of the stock of Holyoke Tran-
script, Inc. at its original inventory value of $333.53 per share. In 
1957, William succeeded his mother as administrator and filed for her 
the second and final account for his father's estate. This account con-
tained substantially the same information as the executrix's first ac-
count and showed a complete distribution to William as administrator. 
William's inventory as administrator included the shares of Holyoke 
Transcript, Inc. at the original inventory value of $333.53 per share. 
A first and final account filed by William as administrator on Feb-
ruary 28, 1958, indicated a complete distribution of all of the personal 
property in the estate, including a distribution of 132 shares of stock 
in Holyoke Transcript, Inc. to the trustee for the benefit of Henry. 
The only remaining account filed prior to the commencement of the 
litigation was the trustee's first account showing that the shares of 
stock in Holyoke Transcript, Inc. had been sold and the proceeds 
used to purchase other investments. 21 
In the four accounts which had been filed in connection with the 
testator's estate, there was no reference to the fact that in 1934 
Holyoke Transcript, Inc. had transferred its newspaper publishing 
business to a new corporation, nor was there any reference to any of 
the shares of stock of the new corporation or the income therefrom. 
Furthermore, the appraisers appointed by the probate court to ap-
praise the stock of Holyoke Transcript, Inc. for purposes of the 
trustee's inventory did not have access to any of the financial informa-
tion relating to the new corporation. With the exception of the 
19 The 132 shares of stock in Holyoke Transcript, Inc. distributed to the trustee were 
valued at $760 per share by three appraisers appointed by the probate court. When the 
shares were distributed by William as administrator, he informed the trustee that it was 
the policy of Holyoke Transcript, Inc. management to build up earned surplus and 
therefore not pay dividends. Subsequently, William offered to purchase shares from the 
trustee at the appraised value, 100 of the shares to be purchased by Holyoke Trans-
cript, Inc. and 32 shares by another corporation controlled by him. The trustee, which 
was a bank, accepted William's offer and at the same time voted to make collateral 
loans to Holyoke Transcript, Inc. and the other corporation in amounts necessary to 
enable the latter corporations to make the stock purchases. Id. at 420-21, 294 N.E.2d at 
372-73. 
2 0 Although the issue was not before the Court, the failure of the executrix to file 
periodic accounts appears to have violated G.L. c. 206, § 1, which requires that an ex-
ecutor file an account "at least once a year ... until his trust is fulfilled .... " 
21 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 421, 294 N.E.2d at 373. 
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trustee's first account, all of the parties, including in one instance a 
guardian ad litem appointed to represent the interests of various 
named minors and unborn and unascertained persons, assented to the 
allowance of the accounts. 22 
The first objection to any account was filed by a guardian ad litem 
appointed in connection with the allowance of the first account of the 
testamentary trustee. In fact, after a thorough investigation of the 
facts, the guardian filed not only an objection to the trustee's account 
but also filed petitions to revoke the decrees allowing the earlier ac-
counts and filed a petition in equity seeking to compel the other ben-
eficiaries of the estate to surrender to the trust its proportionate share 
of the stock in the new corporation and to pay the trust the income 
and profits realized on the stock. 
After receiving the findings of a master-auditor on the liability as-
pects of the case, the probate judge reserved and reported some . 
twenty questions to the Supreme Judicial Court for decision. The 
most significant questions reported raised the issue of whether the 
facts as found by the master-auditor were sufficient to vacate the de-
crees allowing the prior accounts. 23 The Court held that the decrees 
should be vacated on the ground that fraud within the meaning of 
section 24 had been committed by Mrs. Dwight and her son William. 
The Court further held that the trustee of the testamentary trust was 
entitled to a one-sixth share of the ownership of the new corporation 
as well as a proportionate part of all dividends declared by the new 
corporation after Mrs. Dwight's death. 24 Relying on its earlier decision 
in the Jose case, the Court stated that "(t]he case now before us is cer-
tainly one of 'self-dealing' by fiduciaries and also a 'failure to disclose' 
such self-dealing by their accounts."25 
The self-dealing by the fiduciaries in O'Brien was clear. What they 
had done, in effect, was to divert the entire newspaper publishing 
business of Holyoke Transcript, Inc. to a corporation owned and con-
trolled by them. That business, the master-auditor found, was a valu-
able asset and a profitable business venture and the transfer to the 
new corporation without any real consideration26 represented a sub-
stantial loss to Holyoke Transcript, Inc. and seriously diminished the 
value of its stock. In these circumstances, the long-established prohibi-
22 A guardian ad litem was appointed "to represent the interests of various named 
minors and of 'unborn and unascertained persons [who] may be interested' in the al-
lowance of the [first] account" of the executrix. Id. at 418-19, 294 N.E.2d at 372. 
William's first and final account as administrator was also assented to by the trustee of 
the testamentary trust. Id. at 419, 294 N.E.2d 372. 
23 Id. at 424-25, 294 N.E.2d at 375. 
24 Id. at 438, 294 N.E.2d at 383. 
25 Id. at 437, 294 N.E.2d at 382. 
26 While the original lease provided for an annual rental of $75,000 to be paid to 
Holyoke Transcript, Inc., the rent actually paid fluctuated substantially over the years, 
being determined more by the financial needs of the new corporation than by the ac-
tual rental value of the property. ld. at 415, 294 N.E.2d at 369-70. 
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tion against self-dealing applies: "Whatever form the transaction may 
assume, the salutary rule must be enforced which forbids [fiduciaries] 
from reaping a personal profit from the method which they adopt of 
investing or managing the trust estate."27 
Having determined that the fiduciaries had engaged in self-dealing, 
the Court was clearly correct in holding that they were guilty of fraud 
within the meaning of section 24 since their failure to disclose the de-
tails of the inter-corporate transactions deprived the beneficiaries of 
an opportunity to challenge the propriety of those transactions. 
On a related issue, the guardian ad litem contended that the tes-
tamentary trustee was negligent in not gathering into the trust all of 
the assets to which it was entitled. Specifically, the guardian alleged 
that the trustee was negligent in assenting to the allowance of the sec-
ond and final account of Mrs. Dwight as executrix and to the first and 
final account of William as administrator, in failing to take action 
against Mrs. Dwight and her son to recover assets of the trust, and in 
relying on the appraisal of the persons appointed by the probate 
court without having another appraisal made.28 The Court, in holding 
that the trustee was not negligent although it might have acted differ-
ently under the circumstances, reiterated the general rule regarding 
the conduct of trustees: "[A trustee] is required to act in good faith, 
with reasonable prudence and sound judgment, guided by a due and 
rational appreciation of the fiduciary obligation and actuated by an 
honest, intelligent and diligent effort to discharge fully the responsi-
bility which it had voluntarily accepted."29 
In holding that the trustee was not negligent, 30 the Court discussed 
the guardian ad litem's specific allegations. With regard to the 
trustee's assent to the allowance of some of the earlier accounts, the 
Court stated that the trustee had the right to rely on the original in-
ventory showing 798 shares of stock in Holyoke Transcript, Inc. and 
the subsequent accounts which showed the disposition of those 
shares. 31 The trustee was not required to make an audit of the books 
and records of the company to determine whether it still owned at the 
time of distribution of the shares all of the assets which it owned at 
the time of the testator's death.32 Regarding the allegation that the 
trustee was negligent in not taking any action to recover assets from 
27 Bowen v. Richardson, 133 Mass. 293, 296 (1882). Accord, Boston Safe Deposit & 
Trust Co. v. Lewis, 317 Mass. 137, 140, 57 N.E.2d 638, 640 (1944); Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Trusts§ 170, at 364 (1959); 2 A. Scott, Trusts§ 170, at 1297 (3d ed. 1967). 
28 Id. at 442-46, 294 N.E.2d at 385-87. 
29 Id. at 443, 294 N.E.2d at 385-86, quoting Berry v. Kyes, 304 Mass. 56, 58-59, 22 
N.E.2d 622, 624 (1939). Accord, Mcinnes v. Whitman, 313 Mass. 19, 30, 46 N.E.2d 
527, 532 (1943); Gardiner v. Rogers, 267 Mass. 274, 278, 166 N.E. 763, 764 (1929); 
Taft v. Smith, 186 Mass. 31, 32, 70 N.E. 1031, 1032 (1904); Harvard College v. Amory, 
26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461, 465 (1830). 
30 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 442, 294 N.E.2d at 385. 
31 Id. at 444, 294 N.E.2d at 386. 
32 ld. 
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the respondents, the Court simply held that there was not enough 
evidence to support such a finding. 33 On the issue of the trustee's 
failure to have another appraisal of the stock made, the Court held 
that there was no negligence because the evidence did not support a 
finding that the trustee acted in bad faith or failed to exercise reason-
able skill in relying on the probate court appraisal. 34 The Court did 
state, however, that given the trustee's business relationships with the 
Dwight corporations, it might have been desirable to have had the 
bank resign as trustee in favor of one who was totally disinterested 
and to have had an appraisal of the shares made by some third 
person.35 
§5.3. Trusts: Modification: Partial termination. In New England 
Merchants National Bank v. Kann, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court was pre-
sented with the important question of whether, over the objection of 
the sole surviving annuitant, a testamentary trust could be partially 
terminated in favor of the remaindermen where sufficient trust prop-
erty would be set aside to preserve the income interest of the annu-
itant. Unfortunately, the Court failed to reach that question and dis-
missed the remaindermen's claim on the basis of the equitable doc-
trine of unclean hands. The Court held that because the remainder-
men had not agreed to an increase in the amount of the annuity it 
would not permit a partial termination of the trust in their favor. 2 
The trust in question comprised the residue of the estate of Annie 
F. Selfridge, whose will was allowed on July 11, 1935. The residue, 
valued at approximately $450,000, was left in trust to pay the net in-
come to the testatrix's nephew and, after his death, to pay from the 
net income $5,000 annu;illy to a grandnephew and $5,000 annually 
to Josephine Stanley Kann for their lives. The will directed the 
33 Id. at 445, 294 N.E.2d at 386. 
34 Id. at 445-46, 294 N.E.2d at 387. 
35 Id. at 445, 294 N.E.2d at 387. 
§5.3. 1 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 591, 294 N.E.2d 390. 
2 Id. at 593-94, 294 N.E.2d at 393. The remaindermen filed a request for reconsider-
ation which was denied by the Court. In its request, the remaindermen stated, among 
other things: 
The basic issue because of which this case was reported to the Court was the judi-
cial power to order partial termination of the trust in the circumstances presented. 
If the existence of such power were affirmed, the case would then be returned to 
the Probate Court to pass on the discretionary aspects of the case. The Supreme 
Judicial Court, however, acted on those discretionary aspects instead, and did so 
without a proper record to enable it to do so. It is difficult to see how a more ap-
propriate case for resolving the judicial power could be presented, since it will not 
be raised where the parties have reached an agreement. A primary reason for the 
position taken by the charities in the present case was precisely to bring this issue 
to this court for the sake of a permanent and clear rule for other cases. 
Letter from Mark A. Michelson, Attorney for Respondent to Honorable G. Joseph 
Tauro, Chief Justice, Supreme Judicial Court, April 4; 1973, on file at the Offices of 
the Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law. 
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" '[t]rustees to add all income not required for the above payments to 
the principal of the trust ... .' "3 Upon the death of the last surviv-
ing annuitant, the trustees were directed to " 'pay over the principal 
of said fund, together with any accumulated income thereon, free and 
discharged of all trusts' equally to the three named charities". 4 
At the time the trustee filed its petition for modification, Josephine 
Kann was the only surviving annuitant under the trust. The value of 
the trust corpus had increased to approximately $1,870,000, from 
which an annual net income of approximately $48,000 was being 
added to principal. In its petition, the trustee sought to modify the 
trust by increasing the annual stipend to the surviving annuitant from 
$5,000 to approximately $14,000,5 and by seeking authorization to 
distribute the remaining annual income to the charities. In their an-
swer, the charities not only opposed the modification suggested by the 
trustee but also sought a partial termination of the trust so as to per-
mit an immediate transfer to them of so much of the principal of the 
trust as was not necessary to make the annual payments of $5,000 to 
the surviving annuitant. The Attorney General filed an answer in 
which he took the position that no part of the principal of the trust 
should be paid to the charities until the death of the annuitant. The 
probate judge reserved and reported the case without decision to the 
Supreme Judicial Court. 6 
Since all parties were not in agreement on the question of increas-
ing the annuity, the Court correctly ruled that it had no power to 
modify the trust in that regard. By the great weight of authority, a 
fixed-dollar testamentary annuity cannot be altered to take into ac-
count changed circumstances such as an increase in the cost of living 
or a decrease in the value of the dollar absent the consent of all in-
terested parties or appropriate language in the will. 7 A court is simply 
3 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 592, 294 N.E.2d at 392. 
4 Id. at 593, 294 N.E.2d at 392. 
5 The increase in the annuity was requested: 
"so that she will receive annually that amount which is the present economical 
equivalent of an annuity of $5,000.00 per annum at the date of the allowance of 
the testatrix's will increased in accordance with the Consumer Price Index pub-
lished by United States Department of Labor adjusted for the difference in federal 
income taxes, namely, the amount of $14,034.25 per annum." 
Id. at 591 n.1, 294 N.E.2d at 392 n.l. 
6 Id. at 591, 294 N.E.2d at 391. 
7 Rogers v. English, 130 Conn. 332, 33 A.2d 540 (1943); In re Trusteeship under 
Will of Whelan, 263 Minn. 476, 116 N.W.2d 811 (1962); Matter of Kilmer, 11 Misc. 2d 
157, 171 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Sur. Ct. 1958). Cf. Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. 
Stoop, 326 Mass. 363, 366, 95 N.E.2d 161, 163 (1950). See Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts§ 167, at 351 (1959); G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees§§ 562, 815, at 141, 281 
(2d ed. 1960); 2 A. Scott, Trusts§ 167, at 1268 (3d ed. 1967). See also Haskell, Justify-
ing the Principle of Distributive Deviation in the Law of Trusts, 18 Hastings L.J. 267 
(1967); Comm. on Modification, Revocation and Termination of Trusts, Report, Mod-
ification of Terms Regarding Amount or Time of Payments to Income Beneficiaries, 4 
Real Prop., Prob. & Trust J. 359 (1969); Note, Variation of Private Trusts in Response 
to Unforeseen Needs of Beneficiaries: Proposals for Reform, 47 B.U.L. Rev. 567 
(1967). 
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without power to reform or supplement the terms of a testamentary 
instrument in light of developments arising after the death of the tes-
tator in the absence of language in the will evincing such an intent. 8 
This principle applies in the case of a fixed-dollar annuity even where 
it is presumed that the testator may have had a general intent to 
maintain a beneficiary at a given standard of living. 9 Although a court 
can properly authorize or direct the acceleration of enjoyment of a 
gift of income or principal by a sole beneficiary, no such power exists 
where the effect of the acceleration would be to deprive another ben-
eficiary, without his consent, of an interest in the trust property. 10 
With the question of its power to order an increase in the annuity 
removed from the case, the Court directed its attention to that part of 
the remaindermen's answer which sought a partial termination of the 
trust. The Court assumed without deciding that it had the power to 
partially terminate the trust but refused to exercise that power, hold-
ing that by reason of their refusal to agree to an increase in the an-
nuity, the remaindermen were barred from relief under the equitable 
doctrine of unclean hands. 11 
By declining to act on the remaindermen's counterclaim, the Court 
let pass a rare opportunity to settle an important question in the law 
of trusts: whether, over the objection of an annuitant, there exists ju-
dicial power to order a partial termination of a testamentary trust 
8 Sanderson v. Norcross, 242 Mass. 43, 46, 136 N .E. 170, 172 (1922); Anderson v. 
Bean, 220 Mass. 360, 363, 107 N.E. 964,965 (1915). 
9 See generally Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 167, at 351 (1959); 2 A. Scott, 
Trusts§§ 164.1, 167, at 1257, 1268 (3d ed. 1967). 
10 2 A. Scott, Trusts§ 168, at 1288 (3d ed. 1967). A leading case cited for this princi-
ple is Rogers v. English, 130 Conn. 332, 33 A.2d 540 (1943), which involved a situation 
very much like the one presented in Kann. In Rogers, a testamentary trust provided for 
payments to the testator's children not to exceed $4,000 a year. Several of the children 
sought larger payments on the ground that economic changes since the death of the 
testator in 1914, including the imposition of the federal income tax and the 1934 de-
valuation of the dollar, justified an increase in the annuities. The court held that it 
could not properly modify the trust terms, giving weight to the fact that: 
An increase in the amounts of annuities ... would necessarily decrease the amount 
to be distributed at the termination of the trust, and to that extent would be con-
trary to the will of the testator that [the remaindermen] should receive all the fund 
which had not been previously expended under specific directions he had given. 
Id. at 340, 33 A.2d at 543-44. 
11 The Court stated: 
The charities in their counterclaim are seeking equitable relief from this court 
yet they have refused to act equitably. In view of the particular circumstances of 
this case, we think that no persuasive and convincing reason has been presented by 
the charities for opposing an equitable increase in the stipend to the annuitant. In 
the circumstances of this case we believe the adjustment sought is fair and reason-
able, especially in view of the fact that the annuitant is the last living survivor of 
the income beneficiaries of the trust. It is difficult to conceive on the record before 
us of any rational argument that such an adjustment would be contrary to the 
wishes of the testatrix. Moreover its effect on the charities who oppose the adjust-
ment would be relatively insignificant. For these reasons, we decline to act favora-
bly on the counterclaim for equitable relief by the charities. He who seeks equity 
must do equity. 
1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 593-94, 294 N.E.2d at 393. 
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where the annuity is payable solely out of income and provlSlon is 
made for setting aside sufficient trust property to preserve the an-
nuity during the period set forth in the will. Obviously, a resolution of 
the question is important from an estate planner's point of view since 
a clear pronouncement on the issue would better enable him to carry 
out his client's wishes with respect to, among other things, the disposi-
tion of unused excess income and the partial termination of the trust 
in favor of remaindermen. More significant, however, is the effect 
which a resolution of the issue would have on the rights of charitable 
remaindermen. As written, the Court's decision may be interpreted as 
endorsing the rule that testamentary dispositions can be altered only 
if all beneficiaries agree .12 In the context of charitable remainder 
gifts, the Court's decision may be interpreted as permitting an accel-
eration of the remainder only in the situation where the life bene-
ficiary assents. His assent will, of course, be conditioned to a substan-
tial degree on his ability to exact a favorable concession from the re-
maindermen. With that possibility in mind, it would have been pref-
erable for the Court to have acknowledged the existence of a power 
of partial termination in the appropriate case, even if it decided that 
on the facts of the particular case before it an exercise of the power 
was not warranted. Had the Court so acted, further proceedings in 
the probate court could have established the terms and conditions of 
any partial termination. The latter approach would have permitted 
the parties to explore a number of alternatives, including the pur-
chase of a commercial annuity, the payment of a lump sum out of in-
come, or the periodic payment of a percentage of income. 
Notwithstanding the Court's refusal to rule on the question in the 
context of the Kann case, earlier decisional law in Massachusetts and 
elsewhere indicates that a court does have the authority to direct a 
partial termination of a trust in circumstances such as those presented 
in Kann. 13 The general rule, of course, is that a trust will not be par-
tially terminated so Ion?. as any "material purpose" of the trust re-
mains to be carried out. 4 And the rule applies even where all parties 
approve of the termination. In Massachusetts, the rule is: 
[W]here the testator has fixed the time for the termination of the 
trust, and where it is active and its purposes and objects have not 
been fully accomplished and its termination would not best ac-
complish the testator's intent, the trust cannot be terminated even 
with the approval of all parties in interest. 15 
12 Budin v. Levy, 343 Mass. 644, 180 N.E.2d 74 (1962); Bowditch v. Andrew, 90 
Mass. (8 Allen) 339 (1864). 
13 Ames v. Hall, 313 Mass. 33, 37, 46 N.E.2d 403, 405 (1943); Springfield Safe De-
posit & Trust Co. v. Friele, 304 Mass. 224, 227, 23 N.E.2d 138, 140 (1939); Weeks v. 
Pierce, 279 Mass. 108, 116, 181 N.E. 231, 233 (1932). 
14 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 337, at 158 (1959); 4 A. Scott, Trusts § 337, at 
2655 (3d ed. 1967). 
15 Whitney v. Whitney, 317 Mass. 253, 257, 57 N.E.2d 913, 915 (1944). Accord, Gor-
don v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 228 (1955); Rowland v. June, 327 Mass. 
455,99 N.E.2d 283 (1951); Damon v. Damon, 312 Mass. 268,44 N.E.2d 657 (1942). 
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The "material purpose" rule has been applied in numerous cases 
where the interest of the beneficiary seeking termination was post-
poned for a period of years or for a period measured by the duration 
of a preceding beneficial interest. 16 In the early cases dealing with 
these situations, the Court's principal emphasis was on the testator's 
power to postpone a gift in part while still giving the same beneficiary 
some present interest with protection from creditors. 17 In the leading 
case applying the rule, Claflin v. Claflin; 18 the trust simply provided 
that the beneficiary was entitled to partial distributions from the trust 
at ages twenty-one and twenty-five and a final distribution at age 
thirty. Prior to reaching his twenty-fifth birthday, the beneficiary 
sought a termination of the trust. While the Court recognized that the 
beneficiary's interest was absolute and vested, it held against termina-
tion stating: 
[W]e are unable to see that the directions of the testator to the 
trustees, to pay the money [at the stated ages] and not before, are 
against public policy . . . . It cannot be said that these restrictions 
upon the plaintiffs possession and control of the property are al-
together useless, for there is not the same danger that he will 
spend the property while it is in the hands of the trustees as there 
would be if it were in his own. 19 
More recently, the Court has had occasion to apply the "material 
purpose" rule in situations where the remainderman sought partial 
termination of that portion of a trust allegedly not needed to support 
the preceding beneficial interest. For example, in Taylor v. Albree, 20 
the Court was faced with a trust which directed the trustees to pay 
certain annuities to twelve named persons and " '[u]pon the decease 
of all of the annuitants'" to distribute the trust property to the 
testator's heirs at law. 21 Following the death of eleven of the annu-
itants, the remaindermen petitioned for a partial termination of the 
trust. The Court declined to order the termination, stating that "[t]he 
trustees still have active duties to perform" under the will. 22 Likewise, 
in Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Friele, 23 the charitable remain-
dermen were unsuccessful in their efforts to compel a distribution of 
surplus income as earned where three of the original four annuitants 
were living and resisted the distribution. While the Court stated that it 
16 Ryan v. McManus, 323 Mass. 221, 80 N.E. 2d 737 (1948); Allen v. First Nat'! Bank 
& Trust Co., 319 Mass. 693, 67 N.E.2d 472 (1946). See Hoffman v. New England Trust 
Co., 187 Mass. 205, 72 N.E. 952 (1905). 
17 See Dunn v. Dobson, 198 Mass. 142, 84 N.E. 327 (1908); Hoffman v. New England 
Trust Co., 187 Mass. 205, 72 N.E. 952 (1905); Schaffer v. Wadsworth, 106 Mass. 19 
(1870). 
18 149 Mass. 19,20 N.E. 454 (1889). 
19 Id. at 23, 20 N.E. at 456. 
20 309 Mass. 248,34 N.E.2d 601 (1941). 
21 Id. at 251-52, 34 N.E.2d at 603. 
22 Id. at 258-59, 34 N.E.2d at 606. 
23 304 Mass. 224, 23 N.E.2d 138 (1939). 
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was following the general rule of carrying out the testator's intent in 
refusing to order a current distribution of the surplus income, it was 
no doubt influenced by the fact that the annuities were payable out of 
principal, if necessary. 24 
Notwithstanding the Claflin decision and those that have followed it, 
the Court has indicated that where no material purpose would be 
served by continuing the whole or a part of the trust and where the 
testator has not indicated a contrary intent, the trust can be termi-
nated, in whole or in part, even where there is still outstanding a 
prior beneficial interest. 25 For example, in Ames v. Hall, 26 a testamen-
tary trust provided life income to Mrs. Hall of a share of the trust 
fund, a limited power of appointment by her with gifts in default 
thereof, and a further power to appoint an "annuity" of one-third of 
her share of the income to her surviving husband. She exercised only 
the latter power, and the question was whether the default gifts of the 
remaining two-thirds of her share of the trust fund had to await her 
husband's death. 27 The Court affirmed a decree of the probate court 
ordering immediate distribution of the remaining two-thirds of the 
principal, holding that such distribution should be made "among 
those who are to be the main objects of the testator's bounty after the 
death of [the annuitant]. No good reason appears why they should be 
compelled to wait an indefinite period for the death of . . ." the 
annuitant. 28 The Court stated: 
[It has] not hesitated to order termination in whole or in part in 
proper instances. The only safe generalization is that termination 
in whole or in part has been ordered where such termination 
would best accomplish the testator's intent ... and has been de-
nied where it would tend to defeat that intent . . . . In the pres-
ent case the decree fully protects the surviving husband, and a 
present distribution of so much of the fund as is not required for 
his protection will be in accordance with the testator's general 
purpose .... 29 
The result reached in Ames is consistent with the weight of authority 
elsewhere. 30 
24 Id. at 224-25, 23 N.E.2d at 138-39. 
25 See, e.g., Welch v. Trustees of Episcopal Theological School, 189 Mass. 108, 75 
N.E. 139 (1905) (two-thirds of the trust res terminated for the benefit of the charitable 
remainderman where life beneficiary entitled only to one-third income interest); Wil-
liams v. Thacher, 186 Mass. 293, 71 N.E. 567 (1904) (trust terminated as to all property 
except that required to maintain a house and pay taxes for the one beneficiary whose 
interest was to survive distribution of the balance of the principal). 
26 313 Mass. 33, 46 N.E.2d 403 (1943). 
27 Id. at 33-35, 46 N.E.2d at 403-04. 
28 Id. at 37, 46 N.E.2d at 405. 
29 Id. 
30 Whittingham v. California, 214 Cal. 128,4 P.2d 142 (1931); Wayman v. Follansbee, 
253 Ill. 602, 98 N.E. 21 (1912); In re Central Home Trust Co., 61 N.J. Super. 109, 160 
A.2d 186 (1960). See 4 A. Scott, Trusts § 340.2, at 2717 (3d ed. 1967); Restatement 
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It seems, therefore, that although the Court refused in the context 
of the Kann case to commit itself on the question of its power to par-
tially terminate a trust over the objection of one of the beneficiaries, 
such a power exists where there is nothing in the will expressly to the 
contrary and no material purpose would be served by continuing the 
trust as originally written. Indeed, absent the issue of unclean hands, 
the Kann case seems to have been an appropriate case for the exercise 
of the power. Clearly, no interests under the will would have been 
harmed by a partial termination. Nor would partial termination have 
violated any intent expressed by the testatrix in her will. Obviously, 
her primary intent was to give the income from the trust to her 
nephew for life and the principal thereafter to the charitable remain-
dermen. As a subsidiary element, she provided for the two children of 
her nephew by giving them fixed-dollar annuities which may never 
have come into effect or which were likely to be long postponed, as in 
fact they were. This factual pattern is, although more simplified, 
closely similar to that involved in Ames v. Hall, in which the Court 
held that effectuation of the "main scheme" of distribution of princi-
pal on the death of the life tenant should be interfered with as little as 
possible by a subsequent smaller gift of income, and ordered "a pres-
ent distribution" of the bulk of the principal as being "in accordance 
with the testator's general purpose."31 
In view of the importance of the issue raised in Kann to not only 
the parties involved but to the bar and public in general, it is unfor-
tunate that the Court did not resolve it. The public policy considera-
tions implicit in every situation involving charitable gifts deserve a 
clear pronouncement from the Court on the judicial power of partial 
termination. Had the Court acknowledged the existence of the power, 
it could have remanded the case to the probate court for further pro-
ceedings consistent with its opinion. By that method, the probate 
court would then have been authorized to direct a partial termination 
if, but only if, the charitable remaindermen "did equity" and con-
sented to what the parties and the court considered to be an appro-
priate increase in the amount of the annuity. 
§5.4. Wills: Bequests of corporate stock: Stock splits: Ademption. 
In Mas~achusetts, the question of whether a bequest of stock includes 
additional shares resulting from a stock split occurring between the 
date of the execution of the will and the testator's death traditionally 
has been determined by classifying the bequest as general or specific 
and then applying the rule that a general bequest includes only the 
number of shares specified in the will while a specific bequest passes 
(Second) of Trusts § 340 (2) at 173 ( 1959), wherein the rule is formulated as follows: 
Although one or more of the beneficiaries of a trust do not consent to its termina-
tion or are under an incapacity, the court may decree a partial termination of the 
trust if the interest of the beneficiaries who do not consent or are under an in-
capacity are not prejudiced thereby and if the continuance of the trust is not 
necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust. 
31 313 Mass. at 37, 46 N.E.2d at 405. 
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the specified number of shares as well as all accretions created by the 
stock split. 1 The· determination of whether a bequest is general or 
specific is made by ascertaining whether the testator intended to be-
queath "particular property" in making the bequest. 2 In Bostwick v. 
Hurstel, 3 the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the general versus 
specific classification approach, noting that "the problems created by 
the use of the distinction ... in the stock split situation far outweigh 
any advantages it might have."4 The Court adopted instead the simple 
rule followed in a majority of other jurisdictions that "in the absence 
of anything manifesting a contrary intent, a legatee of a bequest of 
stock is entitled to the additional shares received by a testator as a re-
sult of a stock split occurring in the interval between the execution of 
his will and his death."5 
The Court's reasons for rejecting the use of the general versus 
specific classification in the stock split situation were well founded. 
That approach narrowly limited the Court's inquiry into the nature of 
the original bequest and failed to give any real consideration to what 
may have been the testator's intent with specific reference to the dis-
position of the additional shares created by the stock split. Since the 
ultimate disposition of the additional shares was determined solely by 
reference to those factors which indicated whether the original be-
quest was specific or general, the Court was often preoccupied with 
overcoming the presumption that bequests of stock are general6 by 
finding, for example, that the original bequest was of an odd number 
of shares or that the shares originally bequeathed were all that the tes-
tator owned at the time that his will was executed. Furthermore, the 
general versus specific classification approach ignored, in most in-
stances, the basic nature of a stock split as being merely a change in 
form, not a change in the stockholder's proportionate interest in the 
corporation. 7 
In Igoe v. Darby,8 a leading Massachusetts case on the pre-Bostwick 
approach to stock splits, the testatrix owned seventy-six shares of 
American Telephone & Telegraph when she executed her will. A sub-
sequent stock split increased the number of shares to 228 at the time 
of her death. In holding that the original bequests were specific, thus 
passing the additional shares proportionally to the legatees, the Court 
emphasized that the number of shares bequeathed corresponded ex-
§5.4. 1 Lavin v. LeRoe, 349 Mass. 773, 211 N.E.2d 340 (1965); McGuinness v. Bates, 
345 Mass. 632, 189 N.E.2d 212 (1963); Igoe v. Darby, 343 Mass. 145, 177 N.E.2d 676 
(1961); First Nat'l Bank v. Union Hosp., 281 Mass. 64, 183 N.E. 247 (1932); First Nat'l 
Bank v. Charlton, 281 Mass. 72, 183 N.E.250 (1932). 
2 E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Union Hosp., 281 Mass. 64, 68, 183 N.E. 247, 248 (1932). 
3 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1431, 304 N.E.2d 186. 
4 Id. at 1435, 304 N.E.2d at 189. 
5 Id. at 1441, 304 N.E.2d at 192. 
6 E.g., Desoe v. Desoe, 304 Mass. 231,234,23 N.E.2d 82, 83 (1939). 
7 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1435, 304 N.E.2d at 189. 
8 343 Mass. 145, 177 N.E.2d 676 (1961). 
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actly with the number of shares owned by the testatrix at the time her 
will was executed and that the shares originally bequeathed were of 
an "odd amount."9 A similar result was reached in Lavin v. LeRoe,10 in 
which the testator owned an odd number of shar¢s and bequeathed 
all of those shares in definite unequal numbers toj several persons in 
eight specific paragraphs of his will. In McGuinness v. Bates,l 1 on the 
other hand, although the testator made several bequests of stock in 
definite unequal amounts, the Court ruled that the additional shares 
created by the stock split did not pass to the legatees because the orig-
inal bequests were general. The Court relied on the fact that the 
number of shares bequeathed was substantially less than the number 
owned by the testator at the time his will was executedP 
In the Bostwick case, the bequest involved was of "'twenty-five (25) 
shares of stock in ... American Telephone & Teltgraph and also all 
household furniture and furnishings owned by mt! at the time of my 
death.' "13 A later clause bequeathed "'all remaining shares of stock in 
... [A.T. & T.], which I may own at the time of my decease and 
which is not hereinbefore bequeathed ... .' "14 Finally, there was a 
provision in the will setting forth an order of abatement in the event 
that the general assets of the estate were insufficient to pay the debts, 
taxes and expenses of administration. The latter provision empowered 
the executors to sell some of the shares of A. T. & T. with the proviso 
that " 'such sale of stock shall not affect the spef:ific legacy [of the 
twenty-five shares]'."15 . 
The will was executed on April 13, 1957. At tha~ time, the testatrix 
owned 412 shares of A.T. & T. In September J957, she acquired 
forty-five additional shares. Between September ~nd October 1957, 
she sold all 457 shares. Subsequently, a conservator was appointed for 
her, and in May 1958 he repurchased 320 shares. A three-for-one 
split occurred on April 24, 1959, increasing the number of A.T. & T. 
shares held by the conservator to 960. In March 1962, the conservator 
died and a successor was appointed. Between December 1962, and 
September 1963, the successor conservator sold ~ 05 shares, thereby 
reducing the holding to 835 shares. In June 1964,1 a two-for-one split 
occurred, resulting in an additional 835 shares.t· During 1964 and 
1965, the successor conservator sold 385 shares, l aving 1,285 shares 
at the time of the testatrix's death in November 965. By reason of 
the two stock splits, the legatee of the original tweljlty-five shares, who 
was also the executor, distributed to himself 150 shares of A.T. & T. 
The legatee of the remaining stock objected and the probate court 
9 Id. at 148, 177 N.E.2d at 677. 
10 349 Mass. 773, 211 N.E.2d 340 (1965). 
11 345 Mass. 632, 189 N.E.2d 212 (1963). 
12 Id. at 634, 189 N.E.2d at 213. 
13 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1431,304 N.E.2d at 187. 
14 Id. at 1431-32, 304 N.E.2d at 187. 
15 Id. at 1432, 304 N.E.2d at 187. 
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disallowed the distribution, ruling that the original bequest was gen-
eral rather than specific and that the legatee was therefore not enti-
tled to the additional shares. 16 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court discarded its earlier ap-
proach to stock split situations in favor of the majority rule followed 
elsewhere that, absent anything in the will manifesting a contrary in-
tent, a legatee of a bequest of stock is entitled to the additional shares 
created by the split. 17 The Court was persuaded that the new rule was 
a more realistic approach to the problem created by the stock splits in 
three respects. First, the new rule recognized the nature of a stock 
split as a "change in form, with the stockholder's proportionate in-
terest or ownership in the corporation, his rights to dividends and 
rights upon dissolution remaining the same."18 Also, the new rule 
acknowledged the testator's intent, whereas the use of the general ver-
sus specific classification may very well have resulted in frustrating 
rather than effectuating a testator's intent. 19 Finally, the new rule 
would reduce the protracted litigation involved in determining 
whether a particular bequest of stock is specific or general. 20 
The facts of the Bostwick case presented the Court with an ideal 
situation for abandoning the old approach to the stock split situation 
for several reasons. First, there was no indication in the will that the 
testator would not have wanted the legatee to share in the additional 
shares created by the stock split. Indeed, the provision in the will re-
lating to the order of abatement indicated that the testator wanted the 
legatee to enjoy the full value of the shares originally bequeathed. To 
have deprived the legatee of the additional shares would have sub-
stantially reduced the value of the original bequest. 21 Secondly, at the 
16 Id. at 1431, 304 N.E.2d at 186. 
17 See, e.g., Estate of Helfman, 193 Cal. App. 2d 652, 14 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1961), In re 
Vail's Estate, 67 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1953); Allen v. National Bank, 19 Ill. App. 2d 149, 153 
N.E.2d 260 (1958); In re Doonan Estate, 110 N.H. 157, 262 A.2d 281 (1970); Egavian 
v. Egavian, 102 R.I. 740, 232 A.2d 789 (1967); Warner v. Baylor, 204 Va. 867, 134 
S.E.2d 263 (1964); Estate of Barslow, 128 Vt. 192, 260 A.2d 374 (1969). 
18 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1440, 304 N.E.2d at 191. 
19 [F]or example, in a situation where a testator executes a will leaving 100 shares 
of a certain stock to a named legatee and the stock splits two for one ... , if the 
court denies the legatee's right to receive the additional 100 shares, his legacy will 
be thereby reduced to only half of the corporate interest which the testator origi-
nally intended to bequeath. Furthermore, this result will ordinarily be due to a 
corporate decision over which the testator had little or no control. It is highly 
doubtful that this is the ultimate result the testator intended, although the unques-
tioned rule of construction in this jurisdiction is to give effect to the testator's in-
tent where possible. 
ld. at 1436, 304 N.E.2d at 189. 
20 I d. at 1441, 304 N .E.2d at 191. 
21 The two stock splits involved resulted in sextupling the number of shares held by 
the testatrix. Regarding the impact which the splits had on the value of the stock, the 
Court took judicial notice of the fact that each split was immediately followed by a cor-
responding fractional drop in the stock's sales price; rises in the price thereafter oc-
curred only over a period of years. Id. at 1443 n.3, 304 N.E.2d at 192-93 n.3. 
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time that the stock splits occurred, the testatrix was under conser-
vatorship because of her advanced age and mental weakness and pre-
sumably was neither aware of the stock splits nor of their potential ef-
fect on the provisions of her will. Finally, the Court noted that since 
the testatrix was under conservatorship, it was possible that she may 
not have been able to execute a new will even if she 1 had so desired. 22 
The Court was faced in Bostwick with the additional problem that 
the original shares bequeathed by the testatrix had been sold prior to 
the appointment of a conservator. Under Massachusetts law, such a 
sale ordinarily would have resulted in an ademption of the legacy. 23 
However, the shares in Bostwick had been repurchased by the conser-
vator and were part of the testator's estate at the time of her death. 
Since the doctrine of ademption is based on "the actual existence or 
nonexistence" of the bequeathed property at the time of the testator's 
death and "not on the intent of the testator with respect to it," the 
Court reasoned that the presence of the stock in the testator's estate 
precluded an ademption "despite the testatrix's lack of continuous 
ownership. "24 
Finally, although the Court rejected the use of the general versus 
specific classification in the stock split situation, it was careful to point 
out that it was expressing no opinion on the continuing validity of the 
classification for other purposes. 25 Specifically, the Court's holding in 
Bostwick does not disturb the existing rule that the dassification of the 
gift determines questions of ademption of legacies or questions re-
garding the proper order of distribution when the estate is inadequate 
to satisfy all bequests. 26 Also, the Court expressed no opinion on the 
proper distribution of stock dividends occurring after execution of the 
will except to state that it has been held by courts in other jurisdic-
tions that stock dividends do not pass to the named legatee under the 
original bequest.27 
§5.5. New legislation: Purchase of real property from trustees: 
Protection. As long as a trustee is_ acting within the powers con-
22 Id. at 1444, 304 N.E.2d at 193. i 
23 [A bequest of specific property] can only be satisfied by the !thing bequeathed; if 
that has no existence, when the bequest would otherwise become operative, the 
legacy has no effect. If the testator subsequently parts with the property, even if 
he exchanges it for other property or purchases other property with the proceeds, 
the legatee has no claim on the estate for the value of his l~gacy. The legacy is 
adeemed by the act of the testator. ~ 
Tomlinson v. Bury, 145 Mass. 346, 347-48, 14 N.E. 137, 140 (1 87). Accord, Keegan v. 
Norton, 322 Mass. 158, 76 N.E.2d 1 (1947); First Nat'l Bank . Perkins Inst. for the 
Blind, 275 Mass. 498, 176 N.E. 532 (1931); Moffatt v. Heon, 242 Mass. 201, 136 N.E. 
123 (1922). However, the legacy is not adeemed where the sale occurs while the testator 
is under conservatorship. Walsh v. Gillespie, 338 Mass. 278, 154 N.E.2d 906 (1959). 
24 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1445, 304 N.E.2d at 194. 
25 Id. at 1441, 304 N.E.2d at 192. 
26 Igoe v. Darby, 343 Mass. 145, 177 N.E.2d 676 (1961); Moffatt v. Heon, 242 Mass. 
201, 136 N.E. 123 (1922). 
27 See Note, 36 Albany L. Rev. 182, 188-92 (1971); Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 7 (1972). 
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ferred on him in making a transfer of trust property, it is immaterial 
whether the purchaser has notice of the existence of the trust or 
knows of the extent of the trustee's powers under the instrument 
creating the trust. 1 Where the transfer is a breach of trust, however, 
the question always arises as to the rights of the transferee vis-a-vis 
the beneficiaries of the trust relative to the property transferred. 
Generally speaking, the transferee is entitled to prevail if he is a so-
called bona fide purchaser, i.e., a purchaser for value who is without 
notice of the existence of the trust or its terms. 2 In the case of trans-
fers of real property, of course, the transferee is charged with notice 
of what is on record at the registry of deeds for the county in which 
the property is situated;3 presumably all instruments creating trusts of 
real property have been properly recorded. Nevertheless, a title ex-
aminer for a purchaser from a trustee may encounter difficulty in re-
constructing matters affecting the trust which occurred subsequent to 
the recording of the original trust instrument. To increase the protec-
tion of one purchasing real property from a trustee of an inter vivos 
trust, the legislature has enacted a new statute which imposes addi-
tional recording burdens on the trustee which are intended to facili-
tate and insure the accuracy of the title search. 
Chapter 199 of the Acts of 19734 provides that any recordable in-
strument purporting to affect an interest in real estate which is exe-
cuted by any person or persons who, according to the registry rec-
ords, "are or appea:r: to be the trustees of a trust" is binding on the 
trust in favor of "a purchaser or other person relying in good faith on 
such instrument" notwithstanding "(a) inconsistent provisions in the 
trust ... (b) any amendment, revocation, removal or resignation of 
trustee, appointment of additional trustee, or other matter affecting 
the trust ... or (c) any inadequacy in the consideration recited."5 In 
the case of subsection (a), the purchaser is not protected if the trust 
instrument is recorded in the appropriate registry and the place of 
recording is referred to in some instrument in the chain of title. In 
the case of subsection (b), the protection is not available if the items 
referred to therein are recorded in the appropriate registry and noted 
on the margin of the original recorded instrument. 
§5.6. New legislation: Regulation of fiduciaries engaged in trust 
business. Chapter 652 of the Acts of 1973 amends Chapter 203 of 
the General Laws by adding two sections, 4A and 4B, which regulate 
the business of certain fiduciaries engaged in the administration of es-
tates or trusts. 1 In section 4A, the statute defines the term "fiduciary" 
§5.5. 1 4 A. Scott, Trusts § 283, at 2342 (3d ed. 1967). 
2 Smith v. Knapp, 297 Mass. 466, 9 N.E.2d 399 (1937). G.L. c. 203, § 3 provides that 
purchasers for value and without notice take free and clear of all trusts. 
3 E.g., Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass. 546 (1876). 
4 Acts of 1973, c. 199, adding G.L. c. 184, § 34. 
5 Id. 
§5.6. 1 Acts of 1973, c. 652, amending G.L. c. 203, §§ 4A, 4B. 
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as any corporation, bank, trust company or individ4al who engages in 
"trust business" and whose gross annual income frQm such business is 
in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars for three successive years. 
"Trust business" is defined as any activity conducted by an executor 
of a will, an administrator, or a trustee under a testamentary or inter 
vivos trust while acting in such fiduciary capacity. i"Customer" is de-
fined as any resident of the Commonwealth whq engages in trust 
busin<:ss with or enters into discussions or correspdndence creating a 
trust business relationship with a fiduciary. 2 
Section 4B requires every fiduciary, prior to the execution of any 
document creating a fiduciary relationship and provided that he is on 
notice of the customer's intent to execute such a document, to furnish 
the customer with a statement in writing containing certain informa-
tion. Among other things, the statement must state in clear and 
understandable terms that, unless the fiduciary is himself an attorney, 
the customer should obtain and pay for the services of an attorney of 
his own selection to represent his interest and qraft the necessary 
documents; that the interests of the customer, his estate, and the ben-
eficiaries thereof may at times be in conflict with ~he interests of the 
fiduciary; and that officers and employees of a trust company may 
not engage in the practice of law and may not appear for the cus-
tomer or his estate before the probate court. In addition, with respect 
to fees and charges, the statement must include! a schedule of all 
charges, currently applicable, which the fiduciary makes for such ser-
vices; state that such charges are subject to change in the future; 
itemize "in reasonable detail" what services will be rendered for the 
particular fee; and state that legal expenses, whether performed by an 
independent attorney or the fiduciary, are payablej in addition to the 
compensation of the fiduciary. Finally, the statute requires that if it is 
contemplated that any part of the customer's estate! will be invested in 
any common or pooled fund operated by the fiduciary, the fiduciary 
must furnish the customer with detailed financial information regard-
ing the fund, including a copy of its most recent audited published 
report. 3 I 
§5.7. New legislation: Charitable trust: Deviati~n from terms: Cy 
Pres. .Where the particular purpose of a charit~ble trust has been 
rendered impractical or impossible of fulfillment, the Court has the 
power under the doctrine of cy pres to devote the trust property to 
similar charitable purposes if the donor manifesttd a more general 
charitable objective. 1 In most, if not all, of the cases dealing with the 
application of the doctrine, the Court's attention h4s been focused ex-
clusively on the question of whether the donor manifested the more 
2 Id., amending G.L. c. 203, § 4A. 
3 Id., amending G.L. c. 203, § 4B. 
§5.7. 1 Restatement (Second) of Trusts§ 399, at 297 (1959); 4 A. Scott, Trusts§ 399, 
at 3084 (3d ed. 1967). 
24
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1974 [1974], Art. 8
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1974/iss1/8
§5.8 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 107 
general charitable objective. 2 Additionally, in actions seeking the ap-
plication of the doctrine, those persons who would take upon a failure 
of the charitable gift have traditionally been joined as parties. 
Chapter 562 of the Acts of 197 4 amends Chapters 12 and 214 of 
the General Laws, making significant changes not only in the applica-
tion of the doctrine of cy pres itself but also in the procedure govern-
ing actions commenced for the purpose of applying the doctrine. 3 
Chapter 12 was amended by the addition of a new section, 8K, which 
provides that a gift made for a public charitable purpose "shall be 
deemed to have been made with a general intention to devote the 
property to public charitable purposes, unless otherwise provided in a 
written instrument of gift."4 Chapter 214 was amended by adding a 
new section, 1 OB, which does away with the necessity in cy pres ac-
tions of joining as parties those persons who would be entitled to take 
upon the failure of any charitable gift. However, in such actions, 
notice of the proceeding must be given to such persons unless the 
new section 8K is applicable or, if not applicable, unless the action is 
commenced more than twenty years after the death of the donor and 
the court expressly finds that the donor by written instrument man-
ifested a general intention to devote the property to public charitable 
purposes. In the case of an action to permit "reasonable deviation 
from any of the subordinate terms of a charitable gift of a donor who 
has died," neither joinder of nor notification to the persons entitled to 
take upon failure of the gift is necessary. 5 
§5.8. Other legislation. When a minor is entitled to a distribu-
tion of funds from an estate, chapter 232 of the Acts of 1974 permits 
the probate court, upon application of an administrator or executor, 
to authorize a distribution of the funds to the parent of the minor 
where the sum involved is less than two hundred dollars. 1 
Chapter 91 of the Acts of 197 4 amends section 27 of chapter 168 of 
the General Laws to provide that bank deposits standing in the sole 
name of a decedent shall be paid to his legal representative. However, 
if the deposit does not exceed two thousand dollars and no demand 
for payment or notice of proposed withdrawal has been received by 
the bank from a duly appointed executor or administrator within sixty 
days from the date of death, payment may be made directly to the 
surviving spouse or next of kin of the decedent upon presentation of 
2 E.g., Rogers v. Attorney General, 347 Mass. 126, 196 N.E.2d 855 (1964); Anna 
Jacques Hosp. v. Attorney General, 341 Mass. 179,167 N.E.2d 875(1960); Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts § 399, comment i, at 302 (1959); 4 A. Scott, Trusts § 399.2, at 3094 
(3d ed. 1967). 
3 Acts of 1974, c. 562, §§ 1,2, adding G.L. c. 12, § 8K and G.L. c. 214, § lOB. 
4 Id. § 1, adding G.L. c. 12, § 8K. 
5 Id. § 2, adding G.L. c. 214, § lOB. 
§5.8. 1 Acts of 1974, c. 232, adding G.L. c. 215, § 41A. 
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a copy of the death certificate and surrender of the passbook. 2 Section 
19 of the General Laws chapter 170, dealing with shares or accounts 
in a co-operative bank standing in the sole name of the decedent, was 
similarly amended by chapter 91.3 
Chapter 234 of the Acts of 1974 amends section 9A of chapter 197 
of the General Laws by increasing the time within which actions may 
be brought against executors and administrators for personal injury 
and death from two to three years. 4 
Chapter 473 of the Acts of 1973 amends chapter 215 of the Gen-
eral Laws by adding a new section 9A which permits fiduciaries to act 
prior to the expiration of the appeal period. The mjw section provides 
that the acts of all fiduciaries performed after the: entry of a decree 
appointing them as such or authorizing them to : sell, mortgage or 
lease real or personal property and prior to the expiration of the ap-
peal period "shall be valid to the same extent as if said appeal period 
had expired without any appeal" in all instances where no appearance 
was entered against the appointment, sale, mortgage or lease prior to 
the entry of the decree or where an appearance was entered but sub-
sequently withdrawn prior to the entry of the decree. 5 
Chapter 669 of the Acts of 1973 rewrote sections 2, 5 and 6 of 
chapter 206 of the General Laws to require that real property be in-
cluded in the accounts of trustees, guardians and cqnservators. 6 
Chapter 487 of the Acts of 1973 further increa~es the homestead 
exemption from $10,000 to $20,000. 7 
Chapter 495 of the Acts of 1973 increases the value of estates sub-
ject to disposition by a public administrator fr<!Jm less than one 
hundred dollars to less than five hundred dollars. 8 : 
Chapter 728 of the Acts of 1973 amends chapter 215 of the Gen-
eral Laws by inserting a new section 41 which authorizes the probate 
court, upon application of any interested person, to permit the tem-
porary deposit of funds of an unsettled estate in a notice account pro-
vided that the interest payable on the notice account is at a rate 
higher than that of accounts requiring no prior notice of withdrawal.9 
Chapter 677 of the Acts of 1973 added to chaptJr 202 of the Gen-
eral Laws a new section 37 which provides that a ~ecree of the pro-
bate court upon a petition for leave to sell real or !personal property 
shall be sufficient to authorize any action requiring Ia license from the 
probate court. 10 
2 Acts of 1974, c. 91, § 1, amending G.L. c. 168, § 27. 
3 G.L. c. 170 § 19, as amended by Acts of 1974, c. 91, §2. 
4 Acts of 1974, c. 234, amending G.L. c. 197, § 9A. 
5 Acts of 1973, c. 473, adding G.L. c. 215, § 9A. 
6 Acts of 1973, c. 669, amending G.L. c. 206, §§ 2, 5, 6. 
7 Acts of 1973, c. 487, amending G.L. c. 188, §§ 1, 9; G.L. c. 2Q9, § 21; G.L. c. 236, § 
18. 
8 Acts of 1973, c. 495, amending G.L. c. 194, § 17. 
9 Acts of 1973, c. 728, adding G.L. c. 215, § 41. 
10 Acts of 1973, c. 677, adding G.L. c. 202, § 37. 
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